In this study, we examine the role of information and communication technology in complementing information sharing bureaus (or private credit bureaus and public credit registries) for financial sector competition. Hitherto unexplored dimensions of financial sector competition are employed, namely: financial sector dynamics of formalization, informalization and non-formalization. The empirical evidence is based on 53 African countries for the period 2004-2011 and the Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) with forward orthogonal deviations. The findings differ across financial sectors in terms of marginal, net and threshold effects. By introducing the concept of financialization, the study unites two streams of research by: improving the macroeconomic literature on measuring financial development and responding to an evolving field of development literature by means of informal finance. Moreover, a practical method by which to disentangle the effects of reducing information asymmetry on various financial sectors is suggested. Policy implications are discussed. JEL Classification: G20; G29; L96; O40; O55
Introduction
Information asymmetry (IA) between lenders and borrowers can substantially constraint access to finance in the banking industry. From a theoretical viewpoint, information sharing bureaus (ISB) are expected to reduce IA. Information and communication technology (ICT) is an instrument by which ISB mitigate IA by stimulating competition within the financial sector.
Though, a strand of recent African financial development literature has emphasised the need for ISB in reducing IA for financial access (Triki & Gajigo, 2014) , another strand of the literature is articulating the view that ISB may not be stimulating competition in the banking sector for enhanced financial access (Asongu et al., 2016a) . According to the narrative, financial institutions with substantial market influence could be using information from ISB to enjoy a 'quiet life' 2 because of lack of competition within the financial sector.
In addition to the above factors, there are three underlying motivations for positioning an inquiry on the relationship between ICT, reducing IA and financial sector competition in Africa, namely: (i) growing prospects of ICT penetration on the continent; (ii) gaps in the IA literature and (iii) introduction of previously unexplored dimensions of financialization within the framework of financial sector competition.
First, the relevance of ICT is twofold. According to Penard et al. (2012) , the continent is experiencing an uneven development in mobiles phones vis-à-vis the internet. As of 2010, the internet (mobile phone) penetration rate was 9.6% (41%). On the other hand, the authors maintain that whereas ICT penetration has reached saturation points in developed economies, there is still much space for its improvement in Africa. In essence, whereas high-end markets in North America, Asia and Europe are experiencing growth-stabilization in ICT, Africa represents substantial business opportunities for ICT development.
Second, a recent stream of literature is consistent with the narrative that, the introduction of ISB about twelve years ago across the continent was primarily motivated by the need to address the policy syndrome of surplus liquidity in financial institutions (Triki & Gajigo, 2014; Asongu et al., 2016b) 3 . The ISB are destined to reduce adverse selection and moral hazard in the financial industry. Notable ISB have included public credit registries (PCR) and private credit bureaus (PCB) 4 . Financial access issues related to IA that the ISB are designed to mitigate include: affordability, eligibility to bank lending and physical access (Batuo & Kupukile, 2010) .
Despite the severe concerns of financial access in African financial institutions, the literature related on IA in the banking industry of the continent is very limited. For instance, Barth et al. (2009) have focused on nine African countries, Love and Mylenko (2003) on four, and Galindo and Miller (2001) on none. More recently, Asongu et al. (2016a Asongu et al. ( , 2016b have assessed 53 African countries for the period 2004-2011 while Triki and Gajigo (2014) have investigated 42 countries for the period 2006-2009. This inquiry is closest to the last-three studies that have used PCR and PCB as proxies for reducing IA. We steer clear of the stream of literature which has been oriented towards financial access by focusing on financial sector competition. The positioning of the inquiry is also in response to recommendations for more scholarly research on the outcomes of ISB on the continent (Singh et al., 2009, p. 13 ).
Third, this study introduces previously unexplored concepts of financialization within the framework of financial sector competition because to the best of our knowledge such has not been engaged by both broad (Galindo & Miller, 2001; Ivashina, 2009; Tanjung et al., 2010; Houston et al., 2010) and African-specific IA (Singh et al., 2009; Triki & Gajigo, 2014; Asongu et al., 2016a) literature. A possible reason for this missing dimension could be that ISB data is unavailable before 2004. Furthermore, recent financial development literature on competition within the banking sector has focused for the most part on bank participation and bank concentration (O'Toole, 2014; Asongu, 2015a) . By introducing the concept of financialization (which is discussed in-depth in Section 2), the study unites two streams of research by:
improving the macroeconomic literature on measuring financial development and responding to an evolving field of development literature by means of informal finance. Moreover, a practicable method by which to disentangle the effects of reducing IA on various financial sectors is suggested by the study. Whereas a substantial bulk of the literature has examined the relationship between reforms in the financial sector and access to finance (Arestis et al., 2002; Batuo & Kupukile, 2010) , the role of the informal financial sector has often by neglected (see 5 Meagher, 2013; Aryeetey, 2005; Adeusi et al., 2012) . The propositions on financial sector competition which this study uses challenge the mainstream narrative in three principal areas, notably, they: (i) provide a definition of the financial system that integrates the missing informal financial sector; (ii) disentangle the existing definition into its formal and semi-formal components and (iii) introduce the notion of financialization within the perspective of financial sector competition.
The rest of the study is organised in the following manner. The theoretical underpinnings, propositions and related literature are provided in Section 2. Section 3 discusses the data and methodology. The empirical results and policy implications are provided in Section 4 while Section 5 concludes with future research directions.
Theoretical underpinnings, propositions and related literature
Two principal theoretical perspectives dominate the relationship between reducing IA and financial development (Claus & Grimes, 2003; Asongu et al., 2016b) . The first is concerned with the manner in which the risk features of bank assets are transformed whereas the second focuses on channels through which liquidity made available by financial institutions can be enhanced. The two branches of the literature however, accord with the view that the fundamental goal of financial institutions is to transform mobilised deposits into credit for economic operators. The efficiency of resource mobilisation can be boosted by ISB through inter alia:
reducing the cost of and constraints to credit and increasing competition within the financial sector (see Jappelli & Pagano, 2002) . This inquiry is more focused on the latter: how ISB influence competition within the financial sector.
The highlighted perspectives are broadly in accordance with foremost studies on the relevance of reducing IA for financial development, namely: credit rationing models (Jaffee & Russell, 1976; Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981; Williamson, 1986) ; diversification with financial intermediaries (Diamond, 1984) ; communication by banks to investors on potential borrowers (Leland & Pyle, 1977) and ex-ante and ex-post information asymmetry (Diamond & Dybvig, 1983) . Much recent studies are consistent with theoretical perspective that ISB enhance financial access through competition within the financial sector (see Triki & Gajigo, 2014; Asongu et al., 2016a) . In this study, financial sector competition is measured by addressing 6 setbacks in the definition of the financial system by the International Financial Statistics (IFS, 2008 ) that has neglected the informal financial sector (Asongu, 2014a) . (2008). 7 "Accordingly, in undeveloped countries money supply is not equal to liquid liabilities or bank deposits. While in undeveloped countries bank deposits as a ratio of money supply is less than one, in developed countries this ratio is almost equal to 1. This indicator appreciates the degree by which money in circulation is absorbed by the banking system. Here we define 'financial formalization' as the propensity of the formal banking system to absorb money in circulation" (Asongu, 2015a, p. 432) . 8 "This indicator measures the rate at which the semi-formal financial sector is evolving at the expense of formal and informal sectors" (Asongu, 2015a, p. 432) . 9 "This proposition appreciates the degree by which the informal financial sector is developing to the detriment of formal and semi-formal sectors" (Asongu, 2015a, p. 432) . 10 "The proposition measures the deterioration of the formal banking sector in the interest of other financial sectors (informal and semi-formal). From common sense, propositions 5 and 8 should be almost perfectly antagonistic, meaning the former (formal financial development at the cost of other financial sectors) and the latter (formal sector deterioration) should almost display a perfectly negative degree of substitution or correlation" (Asongu, 2015a, p. 432) . (Asongu, 2015a (Asongu, , 2015b Asongu & Odhiambo, 2018b; Asongu & Acha-Anyi, 2017; Meniago & Asongu, 2018) . While The literature on reducing IA for financial access has for the most part been focused on developed countries and the emerging economies of Asia and Latin America, whereas the African continent has not been given the scholarly attention it disserves (Asongu et al., 2016a) .
The broader literature on IA has revolved around two principal themes: the role of IA between creditors on the one hand and the impacts of creditors' rights on strengthened information sharing channels. Accordingly, one stream of studies has focused fundamentally on the importance of stronger creditors' rights in: risk-taking by banks (Houston et al., 2010; Acharya et al., 2011) and bankruptcy (Claessens & Klapper, 2005; Djankov et al., 2007; Brockman & Unlu, 2009 ). Another stream of literature is oriented towards assessing how reducing IA could:
reduce default rates (Jappelli & Pagano, 2002) ; increase access to finance (Djankov et al., 2007; Brown et al., 2009; Triki & Gajigo, 2014) ; reduce credit cost (Brown et al., 2009 ); affect antitrust intervention (Coccorese, 2012) ; influence lending linked to corruption (Barth et al., 2009 ) and affect bank loans that are syndicated (Ivashina, 2009; Tanjung et al., 2010) .
From a macroeconomic angle, the issue about reducing IA has been investigated by Galindo and Miller (2001) who have established that, relative to less developed countries, developed nations which are characterised with ISB are associated with fewer financial access restrictions. According to the narrative, high performing PCR substantially contribute towards the reducing sensitivity by enterprises to investment decisions for 'availability of cash flow'
which is used to proxy for constraints in access to finance. Love and Mylenko (2000) have used ISB to assess if reducing IA between banks and perception managers affect financial credit constraints to establish that credit registries are negatively linked to financial credit constraints.
The authors have established that while PCR do not considerably reduce constraints in financial access, PCB are linked to higher levels in access to finance. Barth et al. (2009) conclude that:
corrupt-oriented lending is mitigated by banking competition and 'corrupt lending' is considerably influenced by firm competition, the legal environment and the structure of ownership in firms and banks. Triki and Gajigo (2014) have recently assessed the role of ISB on financial access, notably: the effect of ISB on firms' access to finance and how the design of ISB affects constraints in access to finance. They have concluded that: (i) substantial cross-country disparities exist in financial constraints and the design of ISB with PCR and (ii) financial access is higher in nations with PCB, compared to their counterparts with PCR or no ISB. Asongu et al. 
Data and Methodology

Data
The study assesses a panel of 53 African countries with data from African Development Indicators (ADI) and the Financial Development and Structure Database (FDSD) of the World Bank for the period 2004-2011. It is important to note that data on PCR and PCB are only available from 2004 while the latest date in the FDSD is 2011. The scope of Africa is in accordance with the stylized facts discussed earlier, notably: the scarce literature on the relationship between reducing IA and financial development on the one hand and on the other hand, severe financial access constraints across the continent.
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The financial sector competition indicators proposed in Table 1 are computed from the FDSD of the World Bank. Consistent with recent African literature, information sharing proxies used to decrease IA are private credit bureaus (PCB) and public credit registries (PCR) (see Triki & Gajigo, 2014; Asongu et al., 2016b) . Three financial sector measurements are used namely:
informal financial development (Propositions 3 and 7); formal financial development (Propositions 1 and 5); and non-formal financial development (Propositions 4 and 8). Semiformal financial development (Propositions 2 and 6) is not employed because of constraints in degrees of freedom.
We employ six control variables to account for concerns in variable omission bias: the lagged dependent variable, public investment, foreign aid, trade, inflation and GDP growth. The choice of these variables for the conditioning information set is in accordance with the financial development literature (see Huang, 2005; Osabuohein & Efobi, 2013; Asongu, 2014b; . The control variables are limited to six because results from a pilot study or preliminary investigation reveal that controlling for more than six variables leads to instrument proliferation.
Foreign aid is theoretically expected to increase financial development because its purpose is to reduce the saving-investment gap that less developed countries face (Easterly, 2005) . From a pragmatic perspective however, development assistance may also negatively affect financial development if inter alia: a substantial portion does not reach destination countries or reaches recipient countries but is immediately siphoned by corrupt officials and deposited in tax havens under the jurisdictions of developed countries. The positive nexus between finance and economic prosperity has been substantially documented (see Greenwood & Jovanovic, 1992; Saint-Paul, 1992; Levine, 1997; Jaffee & Levonian 2001) . Accordingly, economic growth is positively associated with financial development through, among others: enhanced availability of financial resources for investment purposes and increased competition within the banking sector (see Huang, 2011) . Theoretical (Huybens & Smith, 1999) and empirical (Boyd et al., 2001) studies accord with the view that very high inflation is associated with inefficient and less active financial institutions. Trade openness has been documented to be positively linked to financial development (see Do & Levchenko, 2004; Huang &Temple, 2005) .
It is important to also note that the engaged variables in the conditioning information set may affect the formal and informal financial sectors differently.
10 Appendix 1, Appendix 2 and Appendix 3 respectively disclose the definition (and sources), summary statistics and correlation matrix of the variables. From the summary statistics, it is apparent from mean values that variables are comparable. Moreover, from related standard deviations, reasonable estimated nexuses can be expected. The objective of the correlation matrix is to control for potential multicollinearity issues. After a preliminary investigation, the issues are apparent between indicators of financial sector competition. Fortunately, such issues are not of serious nature to bias specifications because the financial sector competition indicators are exclusively used in distinct specifications as dependent variables.
Methodology
Specification
The estimation approach adopted by the study is the Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) that employs forward orthogonal deviations. The strategy is the extension of Arellano and Bover (1995) by Roodman (2009a Roodman ( , 2009b which has been documented to restrict the proliferation of instruments and account for cross-sectional dependence (see Love & Zicchino, 2006; Baltagi, 2008) . The two main conditions for the application of the estimation strategy are also satisfied. First, N>T because the number of time series (T=8) is less than the number of cross sections (N=53). Second, there is persistence in the dependent or financial sector competition variables because as shown in Appendix 4, their correlations with corresponding lags are higher than the rule of thumb threshold of 0.800 The following equations in levels (1) and first difference (2) summarize the estimation procedure.
where, t i FSC , is the financial sector competition (formal, informal and non-formal finances) of country i at period t ; is a constant;  represents the coefficient of autoregression ; ISB , Information Sharing Bureaus (PCR or PCB); ICT , information and communication technology (mobile phone or internet penetration); Inter , interaction between ISB and ICT; W is the vector of five control variables (inflation, public investment, GDP growth, trade and foreign aid), i  is the country-specific effect, t  is the time-specific constant and t i,  the error term. In the specifications, a two-step process is adopted because it accounts for heteroscedasticity.
Consistent with Brambor et al. (2006) on the pitfalls surrounding interactive regressions: (i) all constitutive variables are included in the specifications and (ii) the impact of the modifying policy variables (or ICT) are interpreted as conditional marginal impacts.
Identification and exclusion restrictions
Consistent with recent literature (see Dewan & Ramaprasad, 2014; Asongu & De Moor, 2017; Tchamyou, 2018a Tchamyou, , 2018b Tchamyou & Asongu, 2017; Boateng et al., 2018) , all independent variables are suspected endogenous or predetermined. Therefore, the gmmstyle is considered for the predetermined variables whereas only years are treated as strictly exogenous.
Moreover, the method for treating the ivstyle (years) is 'iv(years, eq(diff))' because it is not very likely for the years to become endogenous in first-difference (see Roodman, 2009b) .
In order to tackle the concern of simultaneity, lagged regressors are employed as instruments for forward-differenced variables. Accordingly, Helmet transformations are performed for the regressors in order on remove fixed effects that are susceptible of affecting the investigated nexuses (see Asongu & De Moor, 2017) . These underlying transformations consist of forward mean-differencing of the variables: instead of subtracting the previous observations for the contemporaneous one, the mean of lead observations are subtracted from the variables (Roodman, 2009b, p. 104) . The transformations enable orthogonal or parallel conditions between lagged and forward-differenced values. In order to limit the loss of data, irrespective of lag numbers, the underlying transformations are computed for observations, with the exception of the last observation for each country. "And because lagged observations do not enter the formula, they are valid as instruments" (Roodman 2009b, p. 104) .
We further argue that the instruments that exhibit strict exogeneity can influence the dependent variable exclusively through explaining variables. While this information criterion has been used in the IV literature (see Beck et al., 2003; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016) , in the GMM approach (with forward orthogonal deviations), the DHT is used to assess if years exhibit strict exogeneity: by explaining financial sector competition exclusively via the proposed endogenous explaining variables or proposed channels. Hence, when reporting the findings, the validity of the exclusion restriction is confirmed when the alternative hypothesis of DHT related to IV (year, eq(diff)) is rejected. positive threshold is feasible because it is within the mobile phone range (minimum to maximum) disclosed by the summary statistics (0.241 to 171.51).
Empirical results
Presentation of results
The following findings can be established in Table 2 on linkages between ICT, formal finance and information asymmetry. First, it is not possible to derive valid inferences from the RHS of Table 2 because at the 1% significance level, post-estimation autocorrelation is still apparent in the residuals. Second, the marginal effect from the interaction between PCR and mobile phones is positive; the corresponding net effect is negative while the positive threshold is within range. Third, whereas the marginal effects from the interactions between ICT and PCB is negative, the net effects of PCB with ICT is positive, while the corresponding negative thresholds are not within the ranges disclosed by the summary statistics. Fourth, the significant control variables have expected signs.
In Table 3 on linkages between ICT, informal finance and information asymmetry, autocorrelation is apparent in the RHS and three specifications of the LHS. The following findings can be established. First, the marginal impact from the interaction between PCR and internet is positive; the corresponding net effect is negative while the positive threshold of 41 is within the internet penetration range (0.031 to 51.00). Second, most of the control variables are significant with expected signs.
Given the high correlation between informal finance and non-formal finance, we complement the findings in Table 3 with those of Table 4 on nexuses between ICT, non-formal finance and information asymmetry. The following findings can be established. First, like with previous tables, valid inferences cannot be established from the RHS because at the 1% significance level, post-estimation autocorrelation is still apparent in the residuals. Second, the marginal effect from the interaction between ISB and ICT is positive; the net effects are negative while the corresponding positive thresholds are within range. Third, most of the significant control variables have expected signs. Instruments  41  41  41  41  41  41  41  41  Countries  45  45  45  45  45  45  45  45  Observations  275  276  272  273  257  258  255  256 *,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments' Subsets. Dif: Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients, Hausman test and the Fisher statistics.
2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) and AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan and Hansen OIR tests. GDP: Gross Domestic Product. 1.043*** 1.086*** 1.058*** 1.072*** ------------(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) Prop.8 (-1) ------------1.118*** 1.068*** 1.063*** 1.060*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) Public Credit Registries ( With respect to existing literature, on the one hand, the edge of PCB is broadly in line with the findings of Love and Mylenko (2003) who have shown that while the presence of private registries are linked to lower financial constraints and higher bank lending share, the impact of public credit registries is less apparent. The findings are also consistent with Triki and Gajigo (2014) who have concluded that, compared to PCR, PCB are more positively sensitive to finance access. Asongu et al. (2016b) have also found financial development dynamics to respond more positively to PCB, compared to PCR. On the other hand, the less positive complementarity of PCR with ICT, contrasts with the results of Singh et al. (2009) which maintain that PCR in Africa are very likely to enhance financial development. The conclusion by Galindo and Miller (2001) Pagano & Jappelli, 1993 , p. 2019 . As a policy implication, in addition to ICT, other complementary mechanisms are needed to limit the substantial power that may be enjoyed by certain banks within the financial sector.
This recommendation aligns with the fact that the substantially documented issues of excess liquidity in African banking institutions (Saxegaard, 2006; Fouda, 2009 ) are partly traceable to the lack of competition within the financial sector.
It is also apparent from Tables 3-4 that PCR are more effective in being complemented with ICT to negatively affect the informal and non-formal financial sectors. It should be noted that ISB also have the mission of playing the role of disciplining borrowers and preventing them from defaulting on their debts and/or seeking refuge in the non-formal and informal financial sectors. Therefore, the ISB also play a significant role in mitigating moral hazard on the part of borrowers. Under this scenario, PCR are more effective at counselling borrowers on the risk of reputational loss and resorting to informal finance. As a policy implication, instruments by which PCB mitigate IA with the help of ICT need to be improved in order to discipline borrowers more effectively.
A fundamental implication of this study is that, the complementarity of ISB and ICT needs to be encouraged and consolidated in order to enhance financial sector competition and ultimately address surplus liquidity concerns in African financial institutions. Such complementarity would benefit from more qualified workers and greater information synchronisation via among others: regular training of ISB staff; 'knowledge economy' (KE)driven economic policies; reliable high-speed access to the internet and instrumentation of ICT banking services.
Conclusion and future research directions
In this study, we have examined the role of information and communication technology Moreover, a practical method by which to disentangle the effects of reducing IA on various financial sectors is suggested by the study. The findings can be extended by assessing the established linkages throughout the conditional distributions of financial sector competition. The motivation for the future research direction is that the relevance of established nexuses may be contingent on initial levels for competition within the financial sector, such that the linkages differ in countries with low, intermediate and high levels of financial sector competition. 
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